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Civil Discovery and the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
BY MICHAEL E. WOLFSON*
An individual's privilege against self-incrimination can be claimed in
any proceeding: criminal or civil, administrative orjudicial, investigatory
or adjudicatory.' The privilege protects disclosure of any information that
an individual reasonably believes could be used against him or could lead
to evidence that might be used against him in a criminal proceeding.2 The
privilege is based upon "the respect a government must accord to the dig-
nity and integrity of its citizens."3
Civil practitioners who recall, albeit dimly, the scope and purpose of
the privilege against self-incrimination usually view it in the reverential
light exemplified by the above quotation. Reliance on such pronounce-
ments, however, is often misleading. A litigant in a civil suit who believes
that the privilege protects him from forced disclosure of potentially in-
criminating information is relying more on the rhetoric that surrounds the
privilege than the substantive law that has come to interpret it. In civil liti-
gation between private parties, the privilege has less application and ef-
fect than it does in the context of a criminal proceeding.4
* Acting Professor of Law, Loyola Law School of Los Angeles; B.A., 1957 Uni-
versity of California, Los Angeles; M.S., 1962 University of California, Los Angeles; J.D.,
1973 Loyola Law School of Los Angeles.
1. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 47 (1967); see also In re Duckett, 76 Cal. App. 3d 692,
698, 143 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104 (1978)(quoting In re Gault); Segretti v. State Bar of California,
15 Cal. 3d 878, 886,544 P.2d 929, 933, 126 Cal. Rptr. 793,797 (1976).
2. Gault, 387 U.S. at 47-48.
3. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). See also Couch v. United States,
409 U.S. 322, 327 (1973). The privilege "respects a private inner sanctum of individual feel-
ing and thought and proscribes state intrusion to extract self-condemnation."
4. See Fremont Indemnity Company v. Superior Court of Orange County, 137
Pacific LawJournal / Vol 15
In the courts of California, the scope and effect of the privilege against
self-incrimination in litigation between private parties depends to a great
extent on whether the litigant claiming the privilege is a plaintiff or a de-
fendant and on whether the case is pursued in a state or a federal court.5 A
comparison of the way the state and federal courts have handled the privi-
lege in civil actions reveals not only substantial differences between the
courts but also differences in the manner in which the privilege has been
applied to plaintiffs and defendants. In the state courts, a plaintiff may
not assert the privilege as to any information relevant to the relief sought
in the action, while a defendant remains free to assert the privilege as to in-
formation of a potentially incriminating nature.' In the federal courts, the
privilege has been accorded substantially broader application, particu-
larly with regard to plaintiffs.7
The context in which the privilege against self-incrimination is asserted
in a civil action is an important factor because of the potential detriment
that the party claiming the privilege may suffer. In contrast to criminal
proceedings,' both state and federal courts in California have held that a
trier of fact may draw an adverse inference from the assertion of the privi-
lege by a party to a civil action.9 Counsel who are unaware of the variety of
differences between application of the privilege in a civil and a criminal
case will find that assertion of the privilege in a civil matter may, at times,
be as costly to their client as would disclosure of the information that is
sought to be protected. A thorough understanding of how the privilege is
applied in a civil action, therefore, is essential when counsel seeks to pro-
tect a client from disclosure of potentially incriminating information dur-
ing litigation.
In addition to the variety of requirements and restrictions placed on the
privilege in a civil case, counsel also must be aware that the courts have
found that a waiver of the privilege through disclosure of information dur-
ing a civil action will permit introduction of the disclosed evidence in a
subsequent criminal case.'° A waiver may be found even when no criminal
proceeding existed or was contemplated at the time the civil case was be-
Cal. App. 3d 554, 187 Cal. Rptr. 137 (1982)(filing of civil action operated to waive constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination with regard to factual issues).
5. Id at 560, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140; see also Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054,
1056-57 (9th Cir. 1979).
6. Shepherd v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 17 Cal. 3d 107, 116-17, 550
P.2d 161, 165-66, 130 Cal. Rptr. 257,261-62 (1976); Fremont Indemnity, 137 Cal. App. 3d at
559-60, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
7. See Gerrans, 582F.2dat 1058.
8. See Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154, 1159-60(9th Cir. 1981); Baker v. Limber,
647 F.2d 912,916-17(9th Cir. 1981); A & M Records, Inc. v. Heilman, 75 Cal. App. 3d 554,
566-67, 142 Cal. Rptr. 390,398 (1977).
9. Gerrans, 592tF.2dat 1058; Shepherd, 17 Cal. 3dat 117,550 P.2d at 165,130 Cal.
Rptr. at 261.
10. London v. Patterson, 463 F.2d 95,97-98 (9th Cir. 1972).
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ing litigated.1' Protection of a client's interests, therefore, extends well be-
yond an existing civil case when potentially incriminating evidence is
involved.
To provide a clear picture of the problems and solutions that have been
addressed by the courts, this article will explore the current role of the
privilege against self-incrimination in civil actions in both the state and
federal courts of California. The article primarily will focus on the privi-
lege in the context of pretrial discovery, since issues regarding the applica-
tion and effect of the privilege often initially arise during the discovery
stage of litigation. Finally, the article will examine the direction the courts
appear to be headed when the privilege is applied in the context of civil lit-
igation.
CURRENT STATUS OF THE PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
The privilege against self-incrimination is available to litigants during
all phases of pretrial discovery. The drafters of both the California and
federal rules of discovery have expressly declared that all information rel-
evant to the subject matter of an action is discoverable, except informa-
tion that is privileged."2 One of the privileges contemplated by the
exception is the privilege against self-incrimination. 3 However, a com-
parison of the approaches adopted by the state and federal courts in Cali-
fornia when a litigant exercises the privilege in response to a request for
pretrial discovery reveals a variety of solutions to the problems that arise
when the privilege is asserted in a civil case.
A. PlaintiffAsserts the Privilege
1. The State Courts of California
In a civil suit, a plaintiff is deemed to have waived his privilege against
self-incrimination as to any factual issues that arise from his complaint. 4
A party seeking civil relief "may not refuse on the grounds of the privilege
to testify on matters relevant to his recovery."' 5 Furthermore, waiver oc-
curs upon the filing of plaintiffs complaint and is applicable throughout
11. Id. at 97-98.
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2016(b).
13. U.S. v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1953); Smith v. B. & 0. R. Co., 473 F. Supp.
572,585 (D. Md. 1979); A & MRecords, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 397.
14. See Britt v. Superior Court of San Diego County, 20 Cal. 3d 844,858,574 P.2d
766,774-75, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695,703 (1978).
15. Shepherd, 17 Cal. 3dat 117,550 P.2dat 165,130 Cal. Rptr. at261.
Pacific LawJournal / Vol. 15
the litigation process. 16
A number of courts have analogized the protections of the privilege
against self-incrimination to those of the doctor-patient privilege. 7 The
latter privilege is waived when a plaintiff places his health or physical con-
dition in issue by the filing of a complaint. Similarly, the state courts have
found a waiver when a plaintiff files a complaint raising issues involving
information of a potentially incriminating nature. 8 Although the doctor-
patient analogy is the vehicle the courts have used to find a waiver, the real
impetus for precluding a plaintiff from effectively asserting the privilege
against self-incrimination is the concept of fundamental fairness. A Cali-
fornia court of appeal, in Fremont Indemnity v. Superior Court,19 framed
the issue as follows:
As we view it, the issue presented by the record here is whether a
person can initiate a lawsuit and then by reliance upon the privi-
lege against self-incrimination effectively prevent the party sued
from getting at the facts by way of discovery, and thus prejudice
preparation of his defense.20
The courts have used the concept of waiver to implement their view of fun-
damental fairness. A plaintiff cannot seek relief in the state courts and
then refuse to disclose relevant information during the discovery pro-
cess.
2 1
A few courts have avoided the full impact of the waiver rule by holding
that while disclosure is required prior to trial, the disclosed information
may be barred at trial as confusing or misleading.22 During pretrial dis-
covery, however, disclosure of all information relevant to the case cannot
be prevented by a plaintiff asserting the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.23 If a plaintiff refuses to disclose requested information during dis-
covery by asserting the privilege, the state courts of California have
responded by dismissing the plaintiffs complaint.24 The courts have re-
peatedly stated that the plaintiff "cannot have his cake and eat it too"-if
the plaintiff wants his lawsuit he must accept waiver of his privilege
against self-incrimination and disclose the requested information.2 5 If the
plaintiff wishes to retain his privilege and keep secret the information
16. See Fremont Indemnity, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
17. Id at 557, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 137-39; Newson v. City of Oakland, 37 Cal. App. 3d
1050, 1055, 112 Cal. Rptr. 890,893 (1974).
18. Newson, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 1055-57,112 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
19. 137 Cal. App. 3d 554, 187 Cal. Rptr. 137(1982).
20. Id at557, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 138.
21. Newson, 37 Cal. App. 3d at 1056-57, 112 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94.
22. See Ellenberger v. Karr, 127 Cal. App. 3d 423, 427, 179 Cal. Rptr. 583, 584
(1982).
23. Seesupra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
24. See id4
25. Fremont Indemnity, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 560, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
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sought through discovery, then he must accept dismissal of his suit.26 Not
only in California, but in a number of state courts across the country, a
plaintiff may not claim the privilege against self-incrimination and still
maintain his lawsuit.27
Faced with the waiver/dismissal rule, how may an attorney seek to pro-
tect his client's interests? It would appear that, short of foregoing the law
suit entirely, the best an attorney can do is to choose those issues and
causes of action that, to the greatest extent possible, avoid areas which
might involve information that could be used against the client in a subse-
quent criminal proceeding. For example, a client with potential causes of
action for breach of contract and intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress (as a result of the way the breach occurred) might be advised to
forego the latter cause of action to protect against disclosure of potentially
incriminating information regarding acts or events bearing on the client's
emotional state during the particular period in question (e.g., possible
drug related activities).
2. The Federal Courts in California
The protections of the privilege are somewhat broader when the plain-
tiff files suit in a federal court in California. In an early case, the Ninth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal of a suit in which the plaintiff
refused to respond to discovery based upon her privilege against self-in-
crimination.2 8 The court, however, in a more recent decision, has adopted
an entirely different approach.29 The case of Campbell v. Gerrans3° reflects
an emerging trend in the federal courts of handling a plaintiff s assertion
of the privilege by balancing the parties' interests, instead of automati-
cally dismissing the plaintiffs complaint.3
Gerrans was a civil rights suit against several police officers.3 2 During
pretrial discovery, the defendants served the plaintiffs with a set of inter-
rogatories containing thirty-four questions. The plaintiffs answered
thirty of these questions, and asserted their privilege against self-incrimi-
nation as to the remaining four questions."3 The district court, relying on
26. Id
27. Note, Toward a Rational Treatment of Plaintiffs who Invoke the Privilege against
Self-Incrimination During Discovery, 66 IowA L. REV. 575,579-80 (1981); Annot. 4 A.L.R.
3d 545 (1965).
28. Lyons v. Johnson, 415 F.2d 540,541-42 (9th Cir. 1969).
29. Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054 (9th Cir. 1979).
30. Id.
31. See Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 608 F.2d 1084, 1087-89 (5th
Cir. 1979), reh'gdenied, 611 F.2d 1026, 1028 (5th Cir. 1980).
32. Gerrans, 592 F.2d at 1055-56.
33. Id. at 1056.
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the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Lyons v. Johnson,34 ordered the plain-
tiffs to answer the disputed questions. When the plaintiffs again refused to
answer, the district court dismissed their complaint. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit reversed. The court found that instead of flatly refusing to respond
to any discovery as in Lyons, the plaintiffs in Gerrans had answered all dis-
covery with the exception of the four marginally relevant and "highly
questionable" interrogatory questions.35 Further, the court stated; "In
light of the Supreme Court decisions on the fifth amendment privilege, a
plea based on this privilege in the discovery stage of a civil case cannot au-
tomatically be characterized as 'willful default' resulting in dismissal."36
The court did not indicate the exact circumstances under which dismissal
might be appropriate. However, the court did note that: (1) dismissal
might be too harsh a sanction when a plaintiff asserts the privilege against
self-incrimination in response to a request for discovery, 37 and (2) the
plaintiffs in Gerrans had narrowly focused their assertion of the privilege
while complying with all other requested discovery, instead of broadly re-
fusing to respond at all.38
From a plaintiff's standpoint, the emerging approach set forth in Ger-
rans is more protective of potentially incriminating information than the
waiver/dismissal rule employed by the state courts of California.39 Selec-
tive assertion of a plaintiffs privilege against self-incrimination and full
compliance with other legitimate discovery requests would appear to pro-
tect the plaintiff from disclosure of incriminating information in a federal
court suit without substantial risk of dismissal of the plaintiff's case.
In the federal courts of California, the plaintiff clearly gains a measure
of protection by asserting the privilege against self-incrimination, while
the defendant loses the ability to obtain relevant and critical information
that would normally be disclosed through the discovery process. Often,
the plaintiff is the primary source of information upon which the defen-
dant must rely for the formulation of his defense. As a result, the inability
to obtain otherwise discoverable information due to the plaintiff's asser-
tion of the privilege may substantially disadvantage a defendant who al-
ready is an unwilling participant in the litigation. As a matter of due
process, it would therefore seem appropriate for a federal court to attempt
to redress this imbalance between the parties.'
Gerrans did not eliminate all potentially detrimental consequences for
34. See supra note 28.
35. Gerrans, 592 F.2d at 1057-58.
36. Id at 1058.
37. See id. at 1057-58.
38. See id. at 1057.
39. Seesupra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
40. See Baker, 647 F.2d at 918 n.6.
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a plaintiff who asserts the privilege against self-incrimination in a civil ac-
tion. Although holding that dismissal of the complaint when the plaintiff
asserts the privilege may be too harsh a consequence, the court left open
the possibility of imposing other sanctions. The court expressly pointed to
the language of Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure giving a
court the power to make orders "which arejust" when a party fails to re-
spond properly to discovery.4 Further, the court emphasized that a trier
of fact may draw an adverse inference from a plaintiff s assertion of the
privilege in a civil suit, citing the decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Baxter v. Palmigiano.42 Finally, the court cited a Second Circuit
case, Gill v. Stolow,43 which held that a court has the responsibility to "do
justice between man and man."' With these principles in mind, a defen-
dant might seek an order precluding the plaintiff from offering evidence
at trial that had not been disclosed to the defendant based on the plain-
tiff's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination during pretrial
discovery. The defendant might also seek an order striking a particular
cause of action when the defendant was precluded from asserting a valid
defense because of information withheld as a result of plaintiff's claim of
the privilege. Clearly, these types of relief fall within the prescribed ambit
of Rule 37.
B. Defendant Asserts the Privilege
When the defendant asserts the privilege against self-incrimination in
response to a request for discovery, no significant difference appears to
exist between the approaches employed by the state and federal courts of
California.45 Both courts have recognized that a defendant may validly as-
sert the privilege against self-incrimination during the discovery process
and generally cannot be compelled to divulge the allegedly privileged in-
formation sought by the opposing party.41
The state courts justify the disparate treatment accorded plaintiffs and
defendants in civil cases on the basis that a party may not refuse, on the
grounds of the privilege, to provide information on matters directly rele-
vant to the relief they affirmatively seek in the action.47 Fundamental fair-
41. Gerrans,592 F.2dat 1058.
42. Id; Baxterv. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976).
43. 240 F.2d 669 (2nd Cir. 1957).
44. Id at 670.
45. State Courts: See Shepherd, 17 Cal. 3d at 116-17,550 P.2d at 165-66, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 261-62; A & M Records, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 397. Federal
Courts: see Baker v. Limber, 647 F.2d 912, 916 (9th Cir. 1981); Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d
1154,1159-61 (9thCir. 1981).
46. See supra note 45.
47. Shepherd, 17 Cal. 3d at 117,550 P.2d at 165, 130 Cal. Rptr. at 261; Fremont In-
demnity, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 559-60, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140; see also Minor v. Minor, 232 So.
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ness and the defendant's right to due process appear to lie at the heart of
the state court rationale.48 A party cannot affirmatively seek relief in a
lawsuit and then refuse to provide relevant information based upon an as-
sertion of the privilege against self-incrimination.4 9 The state courts have
not imposed upon defendants the same concept of waiver, since a defen-
dant is usually not in the position of seeking affirmative relief, but is sim-
ply defending against a plaintiffs claims.50
Since recent Ninth Circuit decisions appear to hold that both plantiffs
and defendants may validly assert the privilege during pretrial discovery,
disparate treatment of parties, which is so clearly evident in the state
courts, is not an issue when a case proceeds through the federal courts in
California5 It should be clear, however, that the courts, both state and
federal, have shown a distinct inclination to accord the privilege a less
sweeping role in civil litigation than it occupies in criminal proceedings.
1. Consequences ofAsserting or Failing to Assert the Privilege
The most striking difference between a defendant's assertion of the
privilege in a civil case arid in a criminal proceeding is that "juristic conse-
quences" may be imposed upon the defendant for asserting the privilege
in civil litigation. 2 The United States Supreme Court has held that a trier
of fact may draw an adverse inference from the assertion of the privilege
by a civil litigant.53 Furthermore, counsel for the opposing party may ar-
gue the adverse inference to the trier of fact. Although Griffin v. Califor-
nia54 prohibits this tactic in a criminal proceeding, Baxter v. Palmigliano55
expressly removes civil cases from the prohibitions set forth in Griffin.56
The state courts of California have followed the adverse inference hold-
ing of Baxter, and additionally have precluded a defendant from offering
evidence at trial that was withheld during pretrial discovery by assertion
2d 746,747 (Fla. 1970) (different treatment accorded the party invoking the privilege when
that party has voluntarily and affirmatively sought relief in the action).
48. See supra note 47.
49. Fremont Indemnity, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 559-60, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140;A & M
Records, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98.
50. See Shepherd, 17 Cal. 3d at 116-17,550 P.2d at 165-66,130 Cal. Rptr. at261-62.
51. See Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154,1159-60 (9th Cir. 1981); Baker v. Limber,
647 F.2d 912, 916-17 (9th Cir. 1981); Campbell v. Gerrans, 592 F.2d 1054, 1056- 58 (9th
Cir. 1979).
52. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 318; Shepherd, 17 Cal. 3d at 117,550 P.2d at 165, 130 Cal.
Rptr. at 26 1.
53. Baxter, 425 US. at 318.
54. 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (comment to thejury by a prosecutor in a state criminal trial
upon a defendant's failure to testify).
55. 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (inmate, charged with breach of prison rules, remained si-
lent at his disciplinary hearing and an adverse inference was drawn from his refusal to tes-
tify).
56. Baxter, 425 U.S. at 317-18.
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of the privilege against self-incrimination.57 As a California court of ap-
peal stated, a defendant must be prevented from ".... claiming his consti-
tutional privilege against self-incrimination in discovery and then
waiving the privilege and testifying at trial. Such a strategy subjects the
opposing party to unwarranted surprise. Alitigant cannot be permitted to
blow hot and cold in this manner."58 A defendant also cannot be permit-
ted to introduce documentary evidence at trial when he has shielded such
evidence from disclosure during discovery by claiming the privilege.59
Although the federal courts have yet to go beyond the adverse inference
holding of Baxter, the "juristic consequences" approach employed by the
state courts would probably be acceptable, to some degree, in the federal
courts." In Gerrans, the Ninth Circuit pointed out that dismissal of an ac-
tion may be an inappropriate remedy for assertion of the privilege against
self-incrimination by a civil litigant, but the court suggested that under
different circumstances a refusal to respond to a valid discovery request
could subject the litigant to Rule 37 sanctions.6' In the Gerrans opinion,
the court was primarily referring to the sanction of dismissal, although
Rule 37 also refers to lesser sanctions such as the striking of claims or de-
fenses, the preclusion of testimony or evidence, and the making of an or-
der declaring that certain facts are deemed established for the purposes of
the litigation.62 These same types of "juristic consequences" have been
employed by the state courts when a defendant asserted the privilege
against self-incrimination in a civil case.63
The courts have also shown substantial concern regarding the time and
manner in which the assertion is made during the discovery process. 4 As-
sertion of the privilege can preclude an opposing party from obtaining rel-
evant and critical discovery. The courts, therefore, have insisted that the
privilege be validly taken, asserted in a timely manner, and limited to in-
formation that clearly falls within its ambit. 5 To place proper limitations
on the privilege, the courts have required the party asserting the privilege
to make a particularized showing of the potentially incriminating nature
57. See supra note 45 (state courts).
58. A & MRecords, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 566, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 397-98.
59. While the concept of "juristic consequences" may afford some protection, at
the time of trial, to the party who is denied disclosure of otherwise discoverable informa-
tion, it does little to solve the problem of how that party is to gather evidence in preparation
for trial, particularly when the opposing party may be the only viable source of information
regarding the issues involved in the action. The ability to effectively prepare a case under
such circumstances is rendered difficult, at best, and impossible, at worst.
60. See Gerrans, 592 F.2d at 1057.
61. Id at 1057-58; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
62. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2).
63. See supra note 45 (state courts).
64. SeeBaker, 647 F.2d at 918-19; Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160.
65. See supra note 64.
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of each question asked or document sought.66 This showing is necessary to
permit a court to rule on the merits of the privilege claim.67 Blanket refus-
als to answer questions or disclose information in response to a valid dis-
covery request are insufficient to relieve a party of the duty to respond to
each question asked or to each document sought by the opposing party.
The litigant's remedy is not the assertion of a blanket refusal to produce
records or testify; instead, the litigant must decide to assert the privilege
as to each question asked and each document requested.68 Requiring a
party to object with specificity to the information sought permits the trial
court to rule on the validity of each of the litigant's individual claims of
privilege, thus achieving the goal of limiting application of the privilege to
only that information which clearly falls within the scope of the privi-
lege.69
By itself, the pendency of a criminal proceeding does not excuse a liti-
gant from the obligation to answer questions or provide information in an
existing civil action.70 A nexus between the risk of criminal conviction and
the information requested must exist before the privilege can be validly
applied.7' Without a particularized assertion as to each question or re-
quest for information, a party cannot carry the burden of demonstrating
the existence of the required nexus. 7 Absent this showing, the court will
order the party to respond to the requested discovery and will enterjudg-
ment against the party for failure to comply.73
2. Timely Assertion of the Privilege
Substantial problems arise when a party fails to assert the privilege
against self-incrimination in a timely manner. The United States Supreme
Court has observed that "the Fifth Amendment is not a self executing
mechanism. It can be affirmatively waived or lost by not asserting it in a
66. See Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160; see also S.E.C. v. First Financial Group of Texas,
Inc., 659 F.2d 660,668 (5th Cir. 1981).
67. -"The claimant is not the final arbiter of the validity of his assertion. A proper
assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege requires, at a minimum, a good faith effort to pro-
vide the trialIjudge with sufficient information from which he can make an intelligent evalu-
ation of the claim" (emphasis in the original). Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160; see also Hoffman v.
United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951). "The privilege normally is not asserted properly by
merely declaring that an answer will incriminate." Brunswick Corp. v. Doff, 638 F.2d 108,
110 (9th Cir. 1981).
68. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845, 852 (5th Cir. 1969); see also United
States v. Malnik, 489 F.2d 682,685 (5th Cir. 1974); Comment, Plainti/f as Deponent, Invok-
ing the Fifth Amendment, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 158 (1981).
69. See Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160.
70. Baker, 647 F.2d at 917; Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 634 F.2d 354,360 (7th Cir.
1980) (cited with approval in Baker, 647 F.2d at 917).
71. Seesupranote70.
72. See Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160.
73. See supra note 64.
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timely fashion."'74
Unless an extension of time is granted, failure to object to a discovery
request within the time fixed by the applicable discovery rule or statute
acts as a waiver of available objections. 5 This is true even for an objection
that the information sought is privileged.76 The automatic waiver provi-
sions that exist in conjunction with a number of the discovery rules, in-
cluding interrogatories, 77 requests for admission,7 8 and requests for
production,79 make imperative the assertion of the privilege on a timely
basis. Silence will cost the litigant all right to assert his privilege against
self-incrimination in response to such discovery.
Another type of timing problem may arise if the civil complaint con-
tains allegations that later could become the subject of a criminal prosecu-
tion. This situation is exemplified by the case of London v. Patterson.80
London was a financial advisor who was sued by one of his clients. Among
other things, the client charged that London had defrauded her. During
the discovery stage of the litigation, London's deposition was taken in
which he made various statements. Approximately three months later,
London was indicted for forgery and grand theft arising out of a transac-
tion that was a part of the subject matter of the civil suit. At the time of his
deposition, London allegedly was unaware that a possible criminal prose-
cution was in the making. At his criminal trial, London did not testify, but
the prosecution read portions of his deposition to the jury and London
was convicted. In a subsequent habeas corpus proceeding, London ar-
gued that the use of his deposition by the prosecution violated his privi-
lege against self-incrimination. London theorized that the deposition
answers he gave were not entirely knowing and voluntary because he had
no notice of the pendency of the criminal matter. London claimed he was
presented the "coercive choice" of either remaining silent at the deposi-
tion and possibly having a large default judgment entered against him or
answering the questions asked at the deposition and possibly having his
responses used in a subsequent criminal prosecution. 81
74. Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160 (citing Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449,466 (1975)).
75. Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160.
76. United States v. 58.16 Acres of Land, 66 F.R.D. 570 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (cited in
Davis, 650 F.2d at 1160).
77. Shenker v. Sportelli, 83 F.R.D. 365 (E.D. Penn. 1979); Leach v. Superior Court
of Shasta County, 111 Cal. App. 3d 841, 169 Cal. Rptr. 42 (1980); FED. R. Civ. P. 33; CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §2030.
78. Perry v. Golub, 74 F.R.D. 360,363 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Schaff v. Superior Court
of Merced County, 146 Cal. App. 3d 921, 924-25, 194 Cal. Rptr. 546, 548 (1983); FED. R.
Civ. P. 36; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §2031; 4A MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 37.02 (2nd
ed., 1975).
79. Balistrieri v. Holtzman, 55 F.R.D. 470,472-73 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Jack v. Wood,
258 Cal. App. 2d 639,65 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1968); FED. R. Civ. P. 34; CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE
§2033; 4A MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §36.03 (2nd ed., 1975).
80. London v. Patterson, 463 F.2d 95 (9th Cir. 1972).
81. Id.at97-98.
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The appellate court rejected London's contentions and affirmed the de-
nial of his petition for habeas corpus relief.82 The affirmance of the trial
court was based primarily on the grounds that London was represented at
the deposition by counsel and the civil complaint alleged facts that consti-
tuted a basis for potential criminal prosecution. Because no objection had
been raised at the deposition, nor had a proper protective order been
sought, the court found London's deposition statements to have been vol-
untary and thus properly admitted at his criminal trial.83
The implications of London are clear. Civil practitioners must be at-
tuned to possible criminal charges that can arise out of the events underly-
ing a civil complaint, and they must assert appropriate objections or seek
a protective order in a timely manner, regardless of whether the client is
the focus of a current criminal proceeding. Without the timely efforts of
counsel, the client will be deemed to have voluntarily waived his privilege
against self-incrimination as to all statements and information he has pro-
vided in a civil action.84 The client may then find this same information in-
troduced against him in a subsequent criminal proceeding.85
In considering whether to assert the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, a litigant must weigh a variety of factors to determine the appropri-
ate course to follow during the discovery phase of a civil action. A simple
outline of the factors to be considered in such a situation should include
the following:
a. Is the discovery that is being sought relevant to the sub-
ject matter of the action?
b. Assuming the allegations contained in the complaint and
subsequent pleadings are true, do they constitute, in whole or in
part, the basis for a possible criminal prosecution? Has the stat-
ute of limitations run on the potential criminal charges?
c. What "juristic consequences" may be imposed by the
coIrt if the party asserts the privilege as to the discovery re-
quested?
d. When must the party either answer or object to the re-
quested discovery based upon the applicable procedural rule?
e. What information being sought by the opposing party
clearly falls within the scope of the privilege?
f. What type of particularized showing can be made so that
the validity of the privilege is clear to the court, yet the informa-
82. Id at 98.
83. Id
84. Id; see also United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1970); United States v. Sol-
omon, 509 F.2d 863 (2nd Cir. 1975).
85. See supra note 84.
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tion sought to be protected remains undisclosed?
By answering the above questions, counsel can determine which infor-
mation should be objected to on the grounds of the privilege; when and
how the objection should be made; and what consequences or costs might
result from interposing the privilege as an objection to an otherwise valid
discovery request. Clearly, careful analysis of the privilege issue is re-
quired. As this article has shown, defendants in civil cases retain the right
to assert their privilege against self-incrimination, but potentially serious
and detrimental costs can be assessed against litigants who assert the priv-
ilege to prevent disclosure of potentially incriminating information.
THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL LITIGATION
The current treatment of the privilege against self-incrimination in the
context of civil discovery shows a clear conflict between one party's right
to obtain relevant information through the discovery process and the op-
posing party's right to claim the privilege while having the merits of the
underlying civil action determined by a trier of fact.86 The approaches
taken by the courts to resolve this conflict cover a wide range of solutions,
but appear to tilt in favor of defendants. The courts apparently believe
that defendants have neither initiated the action nor sought affirmative
relief and therefore, are due an added measure of protection.8 7 The ques-
tion may be asked, however, whether the solutions currently favored by
the courts can be counted on in the future. Once again, the answer seems
to depend upon whether a party is litigating in a state or a federal court.
A. State Courts of California
In the state courts of California, the role of the privilege during civil dis-
covery has been so well defined that major changes are unlikely. Both the
California Supreme Court and the courts of appeal have consistently held
that a party seeking affirmative civil relief may not refuse to provide infor-
mation on matters relevant to their recovery based upon the privilege
against self-incrimination. Moreover, the party is deemed to have waived
his right to assert the privilege upon the filing of the complaint.88 In con-
trast, a defendant in a civil matter may validly assert the privilege, but ap-
86. See generally Note, supra note 27, at 576-94 (discussing conflicting constitu-
tional rights when privilege is claimed in discovery).
87. Keller v. Hilgendorf, 79 F.R.D. 687,689 (E.D. Wis. 1978) ("fundamental fair-
ness requires that a civil defendant be given access to information that may be used against
him during a civil trial"); see also supra note 4.
88. Seesupranotes 14-16.
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propriate "juristic consequences" may be imposed by the court.89
The approach of the state courts to the existence, scope, and effect of
the privilege in civil litigation has the advantage of simplicity, clarity, and
consistency. Litigants and the courts should have little trouble under-
standing and applying the principles of waiver and "juristic conse-
quences" to the wide variety of civil cases in which a party may seek to
assert the privilege against self-incrimination.
1. The Problem Posed by the Filing of a Cross-Complaint
When a defendant asserts a cross-complaint against the plaintiff, has he
waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to information relevant
to the affirmative relief sought? Based on the approach taken by the state
courts, it would appear that waiver has occurred. But what if the cross-
complaint is compulsory instead of permissive? In other words, the filing
of the cross-complaint was not entirely volitional on the part of the defen-
dant, but a result of the subject matter of the plaintiff's suit.90 This appar-
ent lack of a volitional act would appear to preclude application of the
waiver theory to a defendant's filing of a compulsory cross-complaint,
thus leaving him free to assert his privilege against self-incrimination.9'
Finding waiver as to permissive cross-complaints and not as to compul-
sory cross-complaints is the kind of definitional hairsplitting for which
both lawyers and judges are consistently criticized. Furthermore, this
hairsplitting is completely unnecessary in deciding whether or not waiver
has occurred in such situations. For even if a cross-complaint is compul-
sory, a defendant can decide to forego asserting it and suffer the penalty of
permanent loss of his claim. The compulsory cross-complaint provisions
of the California Code of Civil Procedure do not require a party to file a
cross-complaint. However, if a party wishes to assert certain claims
against the opposing party, a complaint must be asserted in the instant ac-
tion or the claims are lost.9' In a similar fashion, a plaintiff who foregoes
the filing of a suit loses his claim as a result of the running of the statute of
limitations.93 The filing of a suit and the assertion of a cross-complaint are
89. See supra note 45 (state courts). These consequences may include drawing of an
adverse inference for the information sought to be protected by the privilege, limiting of ev-
idence that the asserting party may introduce at trial and even the preclusion of a particular
claim or defense.
90. Compare CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §426.10-426.70 (compulsory cross-com-
plaints) with id. §428.10-428.80 (cross-complaints).
91. A compulsory cross-complaint would place the defendant back in a defensive
posture thus the rationale for permitting assertion of the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion would seem to apply.
92. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §426.30.
93. See, e.g., Davies v. Krasna, 14 Cal. 3d 502, 535 P. 2d 1161, 131 Cal. Rptr. 705
(1975).
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both volitional and therefore, whether a cross-complaint is compulsory or
permissive, is of no consequence in deciding whether a waiver of the de-
fendant's privilege against self-incrimination has occurred. Based on the
approach consistently applied by the state courts, a defendant who asserts
a cross-complaint, whether compulsory or permissive, would seem to
have waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to any information
relevant to the affirmative relief sought in the cross-complaint. 94
2. Conflicts With Federal Constitutional Interpretations
Although the waiver/dismissal rule employed by the California courts
is simple and straightforward, the rule seems to be in conflict with the
holding of the United States Supreme Court in Lefkowitz v. Cunning-
ham.95 In Lefkowitz, the appellee challenged a New York statute that ter-
minated a public official's term of office if the official refused to testify
about his conduct in office when subpoenaed by a grand jury or other au-
thorized tribunal. The Court, holding the statute invalid, distinguished its
adverse inference decision in Baxter96 and stated that the inference drawn
from a party's refusal to testify was only one factor to be considered in the
decision to impose sanctions. Conversely, the statute in Lefkowitz auto-
matically terminated a public official's term of office once the official re-
fused to testify.97 The Court found the statutory sanction impermissible
because no other factor needed to be considered.
The state courts of California employ an approach similar to the statute
in Lefkowitz. A party seeking affirmative relief in a civil suit, who refuses
to respond to a valid discovery request based on the privilege against self-
incrimination, will subject his claim for relief to automatic dismissal. The
refusal to testify is not merely a factor to be considered in imposing sanc-
tions, but rather, it is the sole determining factor that the claim will be dis-
missed. Lefkowitz, however, would seem to cast doubt on such an
approach to the privilege problem.
Although the issue apparently has never arisen, a number of distin-
guishing factors in Lefkowitz seem to weaken substantially application of
the case to the waiver/dismissal rule employed by the California courts.
94. See Fremont Indemnity, 137 Cal. App. 3d at 559-60, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 140.
95. Lefkowitzv. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801(1977).
96. See Baxter, supra note 42.
97. The court said:
Baxter did no more than permit an inference to be drawn in a civil case from a
party's refusal to testify. Respondent's silence in Baxter was only one of a number
of factors to be considered by the finder of fact in assessing a penalty, and was given
no more probative value than the facts of the case warranted; here, refusal to waive
the Fifth Amendment privilege leads automatically and without more to the impo-
sition of sanctions.
Lefkowitz, 431 U.S. at 808 n.5.
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First, Lejkowitz involved a grand jury proceeding in which the State of
New York was seeking to compel the respondent's testimony. Second, the
respondent was not in the position of voluntarily seeking affirmative relief
before the grand jury. Lefkowitz, therefore, appears inapplicable on its
facts because the waiver/dismissal rule is limited to civil actions and to
parties who voluntarily assert affirmative claims for relief. The holding in
Lefkowitz nonetheless raises questions about the efficacy of the waiver/
dismissal solution when applied to the problem of a party's assertion of
the privilege in response to an otherwise valid discovery request.
More troubling than the concerns raised in Lejkowitz, however, is a se-
ries of Supreme Court decisions holding that although a state may give its
citizens greater protections than the federal constitution provides, a state
may not deny its citizens the minimum protections accorded by the fed-
eral constitution. 98 The Ninth Circuit in Gerrans held that the federal
Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, precludes the auto-
matic dismissal of a civil suit when a party asserts the privilege against
self-incrimination during pretrial discovery.99 The California waiver/ dis-
missal rule, therefore, may accord California citizens less substantive
rights than those provided by the federal Constitution. If this is indeed the
case, then the California rule would have to give way to those standards
the federal courts, in Gerrans and other cases, have declared constitute the
minimum substantive rights accorded by the federal Constitution.
Gerrans, however, may be inapplicable to the waiver/dismissal solution
employed by the California courts. The issue in Gerrans was whether a
party's refusal to respond to discovery, based upon the assertion of the
privilege against self-incrimination, constituted a willful default suffi-
cient to result in dismissal of the suit. The California cases have not
viewed the issue in the same light.I°0 The state courts have found a know-
ing and voluntary waiver of a party's privilege against self-incrimination,
thus eliminating the constitutional issue entirely. 01 Although arguments
based on Lefkowitz and Gerrans have never been raised in the state courts,
it appears that the waiver/dismissal approach to the problem of a plaintiff
who asserts the privilege against self-incrimination during pretrial discov-
ery is firmly established in the state court system.
98. See Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714,719(1975); Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58,
62 (1967); Mills v. Rogers, 102 S.Ct. 2442, 2449 (1982). "Within our federal system the sub-
stantive rights provided by the Federal Constitution define only a minimum. State law may
recognize liberty interests more extensive than those independently protected by the Fed-
eral Constitution." Id.
99. Seesupra note 36.
100. See Britt, 20 Cal. 3d at 858,574 P.2d at 774-75, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 703.
101. Seesupranote94.
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B. The Federal Courts
The role that the privilege against self-incrimination plays in civil dis-
covery in the federal courts is currently in a state of considerable flux. Un-
til a few years ago, the prevailing view in the federal system was that a
plaintiff waived his privilege against self-incrimination as to any informa-
tion relevant to the issues raised by the complaint." 2 The courts reasoned
that to hold otherwise would unfairly prejudice defendants in the prepa-
ration and presentation of their defense. 0 3 In 1979, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals decided Wehling v. Columbia Broadcasting System0 4
and applied a somewhat different approach to the issue of the assertion of
the privilege in civil litigation.
In Wehling, the plaintiff, who owned a number of trade schools, filed a
suit for libel alleging that he had been defamed by a television news story.
The broadcast stated that the plaintiff had defrauded both his students
and the federal government by abusing federal student loan and grant
programs. When Columbia Broadcasting System (hereinafter referred to
as CBS) sought pretrial discovery from the plaintiff concerning operation
of the schools, the plaintiff invoked his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion and asserted that a grand jury was in the process of investigating the
operations of the schools. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to answer
the questions posed to him by the defendant. The plaintiff then moved for
a protective order asking the court to fashion some type of relief short of
outright dismissal that would respect the rights of both parties. The trial
court denied plaintiff's motion and ordered him to submit to discovery.
Plaintiff once again refused based on his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, and the court dismissed plaintiff's suit.' °5
Wehling epitomizes the case of a plaintiff who retreats behind the cloak
of the privilege against self-incrimination to the substantial detriment of
the party against whom the plaintiff has sought affirmative relief.10 6 The
privilege, therefore, was both a shield and a sword in the hands of the
plaintiff. It protected him from disclosure of potentially incriminating in-
formation, while precluding the defendant from obtaining evidence that
may have provided a valid defense to the plaintiff's allegations. 0 7
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit sought to balance the defendant's need for
102. See Note, supra note 27, at 580 n. 43.
103. See Independent Productions Corp. v. Loew's Inc., 22 F.R.D. 266, 276
(S.D.N.Y. 1958).
104. 608 F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1979), reh'g denied, 611 F.2d 1026 (Sth Cir. 1980).
105. Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1085-86.
106. "In refusing to answer any questions regarding his operation of the schools,
Wehling deprived CBS of information concerning the accuracy of its broadcast and thus
thwarted discovery of issues at the heart of plaintiff's lawsuit." Id. at 1086.
107. Id at 1087.
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information against the constitutional protection that the plaintiff had a
right to assert. 10 8 In particular, the court recognized that the plaintiff
should not be penalized for asserting his privilege against self-incrimina-
tion, but neither should the defendant be placed at a disadvantage as a re-
sult of the plaintiffs assertion of his constitutional right: '09
[W]e emphasize that a civil plaintiff has no absolute right to
both his silence and his lawsuit. Neither, however, does the the
civil defendant have an absolute right to have the action dis-
missed anytime a plaintiff invokes his constitutional privilege.
When plaintiffs silence is constitutionally guaranteed, dismis-
sal is appropriate only where other, less burdensome, remedies
would be an ineffective means of preventing unfairness to de-
fendant. 110
The court rejected a waiver/dismissal solution to the problem, and
adopted a balancing of interests approach that attempted to measure the
relative weights of the parties' competing interests with a view toward ac-
commodating the interests of both sides."1 In applying the balancing ap-
proach to the Wehling facts, the appeals court held that the balance tipped
in favor of the plaintiff. While finding that CBS should not be prejudiced
in developing facts that could relieve the broadcasting system of liability,
the court declared that the plaintiffs constitutional protection against
self-incrimination and his due process right to ajudicial determination of
the suit clearly predominated."I2 The dismissal by the trial court was re-
versed and the case was remanded for entry of a protective order that
stayed discovery until the statute of limitations ran on plaintiff potential
criminal liability."3
Since Wehling, the balancing of interests approach has been expressly
adopted by the District of Columbia Circuit"4 and by various district
courts.11 Although the Ninth Circuit has not fully adopted Wehling, the
court noted in Baker v. Limber"6 the availability of the balancing ap-
proach to protect parties from unfairness during pretrial discovery. Be-
cause the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Gerrans117 uses an approach
108. Id at 1088.
109. Id.
110. Id
111. Id
112. Id
113. Id at 1089. "Although a three yearhiatus in the lawsuit is undesirable from the
standpoint of both the court and the defendant, permitting such inconvenience seems pref-
erable at this point to requiring plaintiff to choose between his silence and his lawsuit." Id.
114. See Black Panther Party v. Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1270-74 (D.C. Cir. 1981), va-
cated, 102 S.Ct. 3505 (1982).
115. See Rockwood Computer Corp. v. Morris, 94 F.R.D. 64 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
116. 647F.2dat9l8n.6.
117. 592F.2d 1054(1979).
1984 / CivilDiscovery
similar to the decision of the Fifth Circuit in Wehling, the Ninth Circuit,
given the proper case, would apparently apply the balancing of interests
approach to the problems that arise when civil litigants assert their privi-
lege against self-incrimination during pretrial discovery.
The Wehling decision and its progeny clearly raise more questions than
they answer. Although balancing of the competing interests of the parties
protects and preserves the rights of each side, no clear criteria have
emerged in weighing each interest during the balancing process. The deci-
sions of Wehling and Black Panther Party v. Smith"8 indicate that a
party's interest in asserting the privilege against self-incrimination usu-
ally outweighs any other competing interest. Similarly, both the substance
and the rhetoric of these cases indicate that a stay of discovery pending the
termination of potential criminal liability is the remedy preferred by the
courts.119
Imposition of a stay of discovery, however, raises a multitude of issues.
How long should the stay last, for example, and under what conditions? If
a party is indicted, should the stay last until the trial is complete, or the ap-
peal resolved, or until all possible habeas corpus petitions have been re-
viewed? Does the opposing party have any remedies for the delay and
prejudice that a lengthy stay of discovery might impose?
The Wehling court recognized that its decision may have created more
problems than it solved, and attempted to address a few of the more obvi-
ous issues. First, the court recognized that possible avenues of discovery
open to CBS at the time the plaintiff asserted his privilege might be closed
when the stay was finally lifted three years later. To solve this problem, the
court held that if the postponing of discovery deprived CBS of crucial in-
formation that otherwise would have been available, and if there was a
clear showing of prejudice to the ability of CBS to prove the truth, a dis-
trict court would be free to fashion whatever remedy was required to pre-
vent such unfairness. 20
Next, the court made clear that the discovery stay was for a specific pe-
riod of time and that its decision should riot be read as requiring that the
stay be extended until the termination of all criminal proceedings, regard-
less of their duration.
Although we have refused to presume that a three-year stay
would necessarily prejudice CBS's efforts to defend against
Wehling's claim, we are aware that a point may be reached
where the likelihood of prejudice is so great that the trial court
could be justified in requiring plaintiff to either submit to dis-
118. See supra note 114.
119. Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1089; Black Panther Party, 661 F.2d at 1274.
120. See Wehling, 608 F.2d at 1089.
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covery or forego his lawsuit. 121
Finally, the court pointed out that the stay was not for all discovery, but
only for discovery that exposed the plaintiff to the risk of self-incrimina-
tion."2 CBS was free, therefore, to engage in all other discovery and even
proceed immediately to trial without deposing the plaintiff.'23
In its denial for rehearing, the court in Wehling pointed out that if CBS
went to trial without full discovery, the plaintiffs continued invocation of
his privilege against self-incrimination would allow the trier of fact to
draw an inference unfavorable to the plaintiff. 124 This potentially negative
inference is one "penalty" that the party who chooses silence and asserts
the privilege still must suffer.
Clearly, room remains for creative representation of parties faced with
the type of problem experienced by the parties in Wehling. The various
factors used in weighing the competing interests of the parties, and the
remedies chosen to protect those interests all are open to the creativity,
persuasiveness, and acumen of counsel. A number of factors, however,
should always be considered by counsel and the courts when approaching
the issue of a party's assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination
during pretrial discovery. Although the following list is far from exhaus-
tive, it distills the issues the courts have examined when using the balanc-
ing of interests approach exemplified by Wehling.
a. Counsel should determine whether the privileged information is
reasonably relevant to the subject matter of the action and falls within the
parameters of Rule 26(b).12 Assertion of the privilege as to requests for in-
formation that are of marginal relevance can be disposed of on the basis of
relevance, and the issue of the privilege can be avoided entirely. 26
b. If the requested information is relevant, counsel should examine
whether the privilege has been properly invoked as to time, manner, and
substance. If the privilege has not been properly invoked, then further in-
quiry would be unnecessary.127
c. If the requested information is relevant and the privilege properly
invoked, then a balancing of interests should be undertaken. The party as-
serting the privilege must show the scope and immediacy of the risk of in-
crimination. 128 Certainly, a party who has been indicted on a related
criminal charge can make a much stronger showing of potential risk than
121. Wehling, reh'g denied, 611 F.2d at 1027.
122. Id.
123. Seeid.
124. Id.
125. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(B).
126. See Gerrans, 592 F.2d at 1057; see also Note, supra note 27, at 595-98.
127. See supra note 64.
128. See supra notes 112-14.
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one who has never even been the subject of a criminal investigation. The
party seeking discovery must then demonstrate his need for the informa-
tion sought and the prejudice that would be suffered if he is denied disclo-
sure of the requested information.2 9 A party who can demonstrate that
the information sought goes to the very heart of his claim or defense, and
that no other avenue exists for obtaining the information, is in a substan-
tially better position than a party seeking information relevant to only a
small portion of the case for which possible alternative sources might ex-
ist.
d. Once the balancing process is complete and one party is found to
have predominant rights and interests, an appropriate remedy should be
fashioned. In this phase, both parties should make a showing of the scope
and impact of each of the remedies proposed. The relationship of the rem-
edy to the problem must also be examined. Certainly, if the information
for which the privilege is asserted applies to only one relatively minor
claim or defense, a complete stay of discovery is inappropriate. The preju-
dice that might result from the imposition of each of the proposed reme-
dies is also an important factor to be considered. A remedy that threatens
the irrevocable loss of critical information to one party or another must
give way to a remedy that results in substantially lesser consequences. 130
e. Even after the remedy is chosen and imposed, the parties must re-
main alert to changing circumstances. Modification of the remedy should
be sought if the impact becomes disproportionate to the original prob-
lem.' 31
f. Even if a restrictive remedy of substantial duration or impact is im-
posed, a party may choose to forego the discovery sought, prepare his case
from other sources, and proceed to trial. Following this course would per-
mit the trier of fact to draw an adverse inference from the continued asser-
tion of the privilege by the opposing party.'32 On the other hand, if the
party asserting the privilege should suddenly decide at trial to waive the
privilege and testify, a court could preclude this tactic on the basis of fun-
damental fairness and the potential prejudice that would be imposed
upon the nonasserting party. 33
CONCLUSION
The state courts of California have developed a simple approach to the
129. See supra note 114.
130. See supra notes 104and 114.
131. Seesupra note 104.
132. See Wehling, reh'g denied, 611 F.2d at 1027.
133. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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problems that arise when a party asserts the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation in response to a request for pretrial discovery. If the asserting party
is the plaintiff, he is precluded from raising the privilege as to any infor-
mation relevant to the relief he seeks in the action. 134 If the asserting party
is the defendant, he may assert the privilege as to potentially incriminat-
ing information, but the court can impose a variety of penalties on him as
a result of refusing to disclose discoverable information. 135
The federal courts of California have allowed both the plaintiff and the
defendant the right to assert the privilege in response to a request for dis-
covery. 136 In recognizing each party's right to raise the privilege, the fed-
eral courts in California and elsewhere have embarked upon a developing
process that, while still somewhat ill-defined, attempts to balance each
party's competing interests in the particular information sought.'37
Although the dismissal solution to the privilege problem still has its ad-
herents in the state courts, the growing trend in the federal system is to-
ward adoption of a balancing of interests approach. Based upon the Ninth
Circuit decision in Gerrans38 and the footnote mention of Wehling139 in
Baker,14° it seems reasonably certain that the Ninth Circuit would apply
the full balancing of interests solution to the privilege problem if faced
with a case that raised the privilege issue in the context of civil discovery.
134. Seesupra notes 14-26 and accompanying text.
135. Seesupra note 45 (state courts) and accompanying text (state courts).
136. Seesupra notes 29-46 and accompanying text.
137. Seesupra notes 104-17 and accompanying text.
138. Seesupra note 117.
139. See supra note 104.
140. See supra note 116.
